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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DESERET LIVESTOCK COMPANY, a
corporation, and ANSCHUTZ
LAND & LIVESTOCK COMPANY,
INC., a corporation,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Case No. 14008
vs.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages by users of electric power
against the supplier for damages to pumps and loss of crops and
forage resulting from negligence of the supplier, for breach of
its contract to supply electricity, and for bjcaach oJEwJjpo^lijed
warranties.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
After a full trial, the trial court, Honorable Stewart
M. Hanson, granted the motion of defendant for dismissal made
at the close of the plaintiff's case.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment of the District
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2Court for errors in law and remand to the District Court for determination of damages.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The appellants, who are the plaintiffs, will be referred
to as Deseret and Hatch (Hatch being the name of the ranch which
is owned by the appellant Anschutz), and the respondent as Power
Company.
Deseret and Hatch are owners of cattle and hay ranches
in Skull Valley, which is south and west of Tooele in Tooele
County.

The ranches cannot raise hay or feed cattle without

water (R. 7 and 28).

Both appellants pump water from wells

through use of electric motors (R. 7 and 27).

On about June 20,

1970, the pumps stopped on both ranches (R. 7 and 28).

Both

managers called Utah Electric Motor for assistance and under the
direction of Al Nytch, whose deposition was taken, the pumps were
repaired.
Deseret had five pumps, of which three were running at
the time of stoppage, one was seriously damaged, one needed superficial attention, and one was not damaged (R. 8, 17). Hatch had
two pumps running, of which one was seriously damaged (R. 28 and 38).
In his deposition, Al Nytch testified that he was pump
foreman for Utah Electric Motor and acquainted with the pumps and
motors at the Deseret and Hatch ranches in Skull Valley prior to
June 18, 1970 (Dep. 3). The pumps were damaged on June 20,
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-31970f and he was called Sunday morning, first by Wells Beck of
Deseret (Dep. 17) and while at Deseret was called by George
Slaugh of the Hatch ranch (Dep. 5, 17). The motors were
undamaged, but one pump at each ranch was seriously damaged by
having been operated in reverse (Dep. 3, 4, 7). The damage
was caused by an outage, followed by a phase reversal, followed
by a correction of the reversal, and the damage to the pumps was
caused by operation of the motors and the pumps in reverse (Dep.
12, 19, 20, 23 and 27).

The phase reversal on a three-phase

circuit can be caused only by man (Dep. 15) and a phase
reversal can be corrected only by man (Dep. 26). The delay
in getting the pumps operative was due to delay in getting necessary
materials and parts (Dep. 7). Ordering new pumps rather
than repair parts and materials would have run into the same delays
(dep. 30, 31).
Exhibit P-6 shows the location of the Deseret and Hatch
ranches.

The power comes to the ranches from the south and goes

first to the Hatch ranch and then to Deseret. Mr. Nytch testified
that a rj^ye^^

Deseret ranch could not

cause damage_tp_the pump.onJ^
at J t h ^

cauae-.damageJtQ^tb^.pv!mp iJLjtfe^

Deserot^xmxch.

A phase reversal south or upstream from the Hatch

JESSLJS^

(Dep. 26-27).

Arthur H. Nielson, Jr., the electrical engineer called

a
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-4by appellants, has had considerable experience with motors being
reversed and testified that the reversal jnwistjbe. the^j^
errors It can occur no other way and only three-phase equipment is
affected, doing no damage to the motors (R. 101). A phase reversal
could not happen accidentally and could not occur while the motor
was running (R. 106). To cause damage at both ranches, the phase
reversal must have been caused by human error upstream from the
Hatch ranch (R. 107).
Dale Brown, a professional engineer employed by the Power
Company, testified that a phase reversal involves "the reconnection
in some manner of phase conductors so as to cause a rotation of
the electrical current, one phase with respect to another, to change
the direction."

(R. 61)

He testified that a phase reversal must

be man-corrected (R. 62), and testified that it is conceivable that
a phase reversal could result from a unique combination of circuits
where a single-phase device is inadvertently opened by lightning
and the right given combination of circuits in the vicinity might
produce a temporary condition of phase reversal (R. 61-62).

There

was no evidence of any lightning at either ranch at the time in
question or of any damage to any single phase appliances or outlets.
Wells Beck testified that there was none at Deseret and George
Slaugh testified that there was none at Hatch (R. 95 and 98).
Dale Brown testified that a phase reversal at the Hatch
ranch could not affect the Deseret ranch and that if phase reversals
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-5occurred on the same day at both ranches, it would have been man
caused or the coincidence of the unique circumstances postulated
by him (R. 65). Mr. Nielson testified that the phase reversal
must have been upstream from the Hatch ranch and could have been
at the generating plant or at the substation (R. 107).
The damage from the pumps being down was loss of crops
of hay and forage. The pump at the Deseret covered 500 acres and
^^^^^^^

cost 1,000 tons of hay, and the loss of pasturage for six weeks
for 1,000 head of cattle (R. 9, 10). Sixty or seventy tons of
protein block were also purchased (R. 17). Hay in 1970 was worth
from $30 to $35 a ton in the stack and would have cost $7 to $8
a ton to put it up (R. 20), as testified by Daniel Freed.

The

forage was worth fifteen cents per day per head and the repair
bills at Deseret were $7,837.11 (R. 21-22).
At Hatch, the pump was down 60 to 70 days with repair
bills of $1,679.84 (R. 30) and loss of 90 days of feed for 300
head of cattle or 900 Animal Unit Months worth $4.50 per unit
(R. 29). The complaint was amended to reflect $7,837.11 damage
for pumps and motors at Deseret and $29,300 for loss of hay and
forage or a total of $37,137.11 for the first three Causes of
Action and for the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action
$1,679.84 for repair to pumps and motors and $4,050 for loss of
forage, or a total of $5,729.84 (R. 114).
Dale Brown testified that because of the way the line
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-6is conducted, it would be extremely difficult for a phase reversal
to be caused (R. 85-88) and in his opinion, it couldn't happen on
the Power Company's system (R. 88).
There was testimony about protective devices. The pumps
were equipped in 1970 with time delay devices (Dep. 9, R. 18).
Protective devices against phase reversal used to cost $5,500 to
$7,000 (R. 104) and now approximately $200 (R. 104, Dep. 9).
The only proof of formal notice to Power Company was
Exhibit 5-P dated February 11, 1971 (R. 45). The Power Company's
records contain no reports of trouble, repair work or outage on
the Skull Valley line at or about June 18-21, 1970 (R. 51).
A. R. Dunn testified that Exhibit 2-P is a standard
electric service agreement and that the service of both appellants
is subject to Regulations issued by the Public Service Commission,
including regulations 18 and 22, portions of which appear at R. 72
as follows:
"Regulation 18. Continuity of Service. The Company
shall use reasonable diligence to provide steady and
continuous service, but does not guarantee its service
against irregularities and interruptions. The Company
having used reasonable diligence shall not be liable
to Customers for any damages occasioned by irregularities
or interruptions."
"Regulation 22. Customer's Responsibility. The
Customer assumes all responsibility on Customer's
side of the Point of Delivery for service supplied
or taken, as well as for the electrical installation
and appliances used in connection therewith, and will
indemnify, save harmless and defend the Company against
all claims, demands, costs or expenses, for loss,
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-7damage or injury to persons or property, in any
manner directly or indirectly connected with, or
growing out of, the transmission or use of electric
service by the Customer, at or on the Customer's
side of the Point of Delivery."
At the close of plaintiffs' case, defendant made a motion
jt^dism^

which was taken under advisement

(R. 44). This motion was not renewed.

The defendant put on its

case and at the close of the case, the matter was argued and taken
under advisement.
The Memorandum Decision of the Court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss (R. 156). Order of Dismissal was entered (R.
159-160, 167-168).

Later, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law were made and entered (R. 162).
ARGUMENT
Point I:

Finding of Fact No. 14 and Conclusion of Law

No. 1 are based on defendant's evidence and are inconsistent with
the Order of Dismissal.
Point II: Finding of Fact No. 14 is not supported by
evidence and Conclusion of Law No. 1 is unsupported.
Point III: Review by this Court should be of plaintiffs'
evidence only.
Point IV:

Res ipsa loquitur is applicable to the facts

of this case:

Point V:

A.

From plaintiffs' evidence;

B.

From all the evidence.

There was a breach of the electrical service
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-8agreements.
Point VI: There was a breach of implied warranty of
fitness.
Point VII: Plaintiffs1 damages exceeded the cost of
repairs of pumps.
POINT I
FINDING OF FACT NO. 14 AND CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 1 ARE
BASED ON DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE AND ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE ORDER
OF DISMISSAL.
Defendant's motion, made at the close of plaintiffs1
main case, was "to have the complaint dismissed because there
has been no showing whatever of any negligence on the part of
the company to support the plaintiffs' claim.

I think the proof

presented by plaintiffs has been completely lacking in attaching
any liability to this defendant on any ground."

(R. 43)

Following statements by counsel, the Court ruled:
"Well, I will take your motion under advisement,
Mr. Gordon, and you can stop now or you can proceed
without waiving your motion." (R. 44, Lines 11-13)
The defendant elected to proceed without waiving its motion, and
the motion was not renewed at the close of all the evidence.
The Court's Memorandum Decision (R. 156-157)
"finds and concludes that the defendant's motion
to dismiss should be granted."
And thereafter, an Order of Dismissal was prepared and signed
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-9(R. 159-160) and objected to by the plaintiffs for the reason
that Findings of Fact are required by Rules 41 (b) and 52(a).
Thereafter, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were
prepared and submitted (R. 162-166), including Finding of Fact
No. 14 and Conclusion of Law No. 1, which are based upon evidence
submitted by the defendant.
Since the only motion to dismiss made by the defendant
was made at the close of plaintiffs1 case, the granting of the
motion and the subsequent dismissal are of necessity limited to
the plaintiffs1 evidence. This is true under the Federal Rule
41(b), because under that Rule there is no provision for taking
the motion under advisement.

It follows that evidence admitted

after the motion cannot support the Findings made to effectuate
the motion to dismiss. Charles v. Judge and Dolph, (C.A. 7th
1959), 263 F.2d 864. i |fiN^ 1 ^
The Utah Rule 41(b) as to this portion of the Rule is
identical with the Federal Rule and provides:
"The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff
or may decline to render any judgment until the
close of all the evidence."
There is nothing which empowers the Court to hear the defendant's
case and then rule on the motion to dismiss in the light of the
defendant's evidence. The practice of taking the motion under
advisement until the defendant has presented its evidence is
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-10only a delay of the ruling and not an expansion of the evidence
upon which the ruling is made.
POINT II
FINDING OF FACT NO, 14 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE AND
CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 1 IS UNSUPPORTED.
The second sentence of Finding of Fact No. 14 is supported
by evidence that the records of the Power Company do not contain
any complaints or trouble calls from the customers. The first
and third sentences of Finding No. 14 are based exclusively upon
the silence of the Power Company's records.

Gail A. Parker

testified that the files of the Company were silent on complaints
concerning these incidents, reports of outage, or reports of
maintenance or repair work done (R. 50-51).

It is obvious that

if the incidents were reflected in the company's records, the
case would not have been attended by difficulty of proof and the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would not have loomed so significant.

But absence of reports in the company's files, and absence

of activity by agents or employees of the company which were
unreported are two different things. Mr. Nielson, Mr. Brown, and
Mr. Nytch, as well as Mr. Parker, recognized the damage as
resulting from a phase reversal and that the correction of the
phase reversal, however caused, would have to be done by men
(R. 58, 62, 100, Nytch Dep. 15), and the evidence was so plain
and overwhelming that the phase reversal in the first place could
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-11have been induced only by an act of man that the negative
evidence of the power company must be rejected, since it does
not elucidate what happened and who was responsible.
Conclusion of Law No. 1 being based on Finding of Fact
No. 14 must be rejected along with the Finding of Fact.
POINT III
REVIEW BY THIS COURT SHOULD BE OF PLAINTIFFS1 EVIDENCE
ONLY.
This follows from the argument made under Point I.
Objection was made to Finding of Fact No. 14 and Conclusion of
Law No. 1 before the trial court and the objections were denied
(R. 170, 172) for reasons that seemed ambivalent.

The entire

record is brought before this Court to avoid further proceedings
in the event this Court holds that even though the form of
the Order was erroneous, the intent was to weigh the evidence
on both sides and find in favor of the defendant.
Appellants submit that the logical approach to the
question is to determine whether the plaintiffs' evidence made
a prima facie case on all of the Causes of Action, with the
assistance of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on Causes of Action
1 and 4.

If that be established, the question then is whether

the evidence of defendant as reflected in Finding of Fact No. 14
and Conclusion of Law No. 1 is supportable and dispositive of
the Causes of Action.
Since Findings of Fact were made, it appears that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12scope of review by this Court of the Findings of Fact properly
made would be in a light favorable to the trial court and to the
Findings.

Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R. Co., 3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P.2d

335.
The failure of the Court to make any Findings of Fact
as to the Second, Third, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action, despite
the objections of the plaintiffs thereto (R. 170), means that the
evidence as to those Causes of Action shall be reviewed by this
Court in a light most favorable to appellants.

Davis v. Payne and

Day, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P.2d 337.
POINT IV
RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE.
A.

FROM PLAINTIFFS1 EVIDENCE.

The trial court ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not apply because the damage sustained by plaintiffs
occurred entirely on their own property (Conclusions of Law,
Paragraph 2, R. 166; Memorandum Decision, R. 156). The trial
court's ruling was clearly an erroneous application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
This Court has frequently considered the doctrine,
which consideration has resulted in a precise definition.

In

Moore v. James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P.2d 221 (1956), this Court
declared that the doctrine would give rise to an inference of
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-13negligence when three conditions are met.
11

(1) The accident was of a kind which, in the
ordinary course of events, would not have happened
had the defendant used the due care, (2) The instrument
or thing causing the injury was at the time of the
accident under the management and control of the
defendant, and (3) The accident happened irrespective
of any prticipation at the time by the plaintiff."
5 Utah 2d at 96.
The first condition requires a finding that the accident
is of a type which does not ordinarily happen. Plaintiffs1
experts testified that the damage to plaintiffsf pumps was
caused by a phase reversal, a phenomenon which ordinarily does
not occur and is always man-caused (R. 101 and Nytch Dep. 15).
The first condition further requires a finding that the
accident would not ordinarily happen unless the defendant did
not exercise due care. The only evidence before the Court was
that a phase reversal results from a faulty power source caused
by a man-made, physical act of switching or reversing one
electrical line with another.

(Findings of Fact, 1[ 10, R. 165;

Nytch Dep. p. 15; R. 101). The evidence further showed that the
plaintiffs did not tamper or otherwise interfere with the
electrical power lines or associated equipment at or just before
the time of the damage (R. 8, 12, 37, 41). The highly improbable
coincidence of a phase reversal on both plaintiffs1 ranches
provides compelling evidence that the phase reversal was caused
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-14by a lack of due care by the defendant, the common source of
electrical power used by the two ranches.
To conclude that a phase reversal—an event so uncommon
as to be considered a "freak" happening—occurred simultaneously
on two separate, unrelated ranches when no ranch employees were
working on or were near the motors or the transmission lines and
for lack of proof dismiss the common supplier as the cause, stretches
plausibility to the limit.
Reason and logic, as well as the weight of the evidence,
compel the conclusion that a phase reversal on two separate
ranches was an event which would not have happened had the
defendant used due care.
The second condition requires a finding that the
instrumentality causing the accident was exclusively controlled
by the defendant.

The trial court apparently read this condition

as requiring a finding that the damage have a physical situs
within the exclusive control of the defendant.

The trial court

concluded that because the damaged pumps were physically upon
the property of plaintiffs, and because plaintiffs maintained
their own transmission lines and equipment, the second condition
could not be met (Conclusions of Law, fl 2; Memorandum Decision,
R. 166, 156). The trial court obviously confused "cause" which
definitely must be within the control of the defendant, with
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-1511

injury" which need not be physically within the control of the

defendant.
The difference between the control of "cause" and
"injury" was made readily apparent by this Court in Lund v.
Phillips Petroleum Company, 10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d 952 (1960),
where the paint on plaintiffs' automobiles was allegedly damaged
by some deleterious substance in smoke and soot emitted from a
flare stack at the defendant's oil refinery.

The application

of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was appropriate there,
even though the damaged cars were under the control of the
plaintiffs.

The doctrine was applicable because the cause—

smoke—was controlled by the defendant.

The cause of the injury

in the instant case was a faulty electrical current which was
being supplied to both plaintiffs. Neither plaintiff had any
degree of control whatsoever over the common source of electrical
power which was the cause of the injury.
The third condition requires a finding that neither
of the plaintiffs participated at the time of the accident. The
uncontroverted evidence is that neither of the plaintiffs nor
their employees or agents interfered in any way with the operation
of the pumps at the time of the damage (R. 8, 12, 37, 41). More
important, however, is the fact that because neither plaintiff
had any control whatsoever over the common electrical source,
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-16neither plaintiff could interfere with the factual cause of the
damage.
All of the admissible evidence before the trial court
leads to the inescapable conclusion that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur should be applied.

This Court has never hesitated

to apply the doctrine when it is appropriate, such as in the Lund
case and in the present case.

In Moore v. James, supra, this

Court held that it would be prejudicial error for a court not
to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur in a case where, as
in the present case, all of the elements have been satisfied.
In Wightman

v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 5 Utah 2d 373,

302 P.2d 471 (1956), this Court refused to apply the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur to a fact situation which at first blush
appears to be somewhat similar to the present case. There, the
administratrix of an estate sued the defendant for the death
of the deceased, which resulted from a natural gas explosion
and fire. The defendant, as in the present case, maintained
the means to deliver the energy source—gas—up to the home of
the deceased, and deceased maintained the various appliances
beyond that point.

The real issue for the Court to determine

was where the explosion occurred.

The Court held that there

was no evidence to lead the finder of fact to conclude that there
was greater probability that the explosion occurred in that part
of the system maintained by the gas company.
The present case may be distinguished in several
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-17important respects.

In Wightman, the Court said:

»* * * T O give rise to a jury question, there
must be something in evidence from which the
jury could reasonably believe that there is a
greater probability that the explosion occurred
in that part of the installation than in the
pxpes or applxances installed by and under the
control of the plaintiff. Only xf there is some
such basis in the evidence would there be any
foundation to permit the jury under res ipsa
loquitur to infer that some defect or lack of
due care on the gas company's part of the
installation caused the leak and the resulting
explosion." 5 Utah 2d 376. (Emphasis added)
In the present case the coincidence of a phase reversal
on two separate ranches makes it l^gxjscy^

the

phase reversal occurred in a portion of the transmission system
maintained by the defendant Ji^giri.

This proof was lacking

in the Wightman case.
In the Wightman case, the gas per se was not faulty.
Rather, the gas in combination with some faulty-associated
equipment caused the injury.

In the present case, the electrical

power was faulty or delivered in a faulty manner, independent
of associated equipment.
B.

FROM ALL THE EVIDENCE.

There was no evidence whatever of anyone working on
plaintiffs1 pumps, motors, or transmission lines or of even being
near them at the time of the outage and reversal. The experts
agreed that there had to be an outage, transmission of energy
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-18in reversed phase, then an outage, then correction of the reversed
connections.

Even the unique and completely unproven speculation

of Dale Brown that on two ranches, at or about the same time,
lightning shorted a single-phase device and a certain unknown
and undescribed combination of three-phase circuitry caused a
reversal of phases, is disproved.

Dale Brown agreed that there

had to be a correction by a man (R. 62). In this he agreed with
Arthur Nielson (R. 100), as did Mr. Nytch (Dep. 15). Plaintiffs
did not correct the reversal; Al Nytch did not correct it; the
correction had to be made on the power company's line by someone
who did not report his blunder.
Defendant's evidence does not help establish the precise
nature and location of the phase reversal. The real question
is, in what form, and with what effect does the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur survive the defendant's inconclusive showing?
Appellants submit that the effect of the doctrine survives,
whether it be called inference or presumption, and that the
balance of probabilities weighs heavily in favor of a finding
that the phase reversal occurred upstream from the Hatch ranch
and on the power company's line and was man-caused and man-corrected.
In Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra, at page 280
of 10 Utah 2, the Court thus described the procedure of res ipsa
loquitur, that it permits the injured party:
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-19"To present his grievance to a court or jury
on the basis that an inference of negligence
may reasonably be drawn from such facts; and
cast the burden upon the other to make proof
of what happened. This inference of negligence
remains in the case: It justifies its submission
to the jury; and will sustain a finding of
negligence, even though there be countervailing
evidence, unless such adverse evidence so conclusively shows non-negligence of the defendant
that reasonable minds, acting fairly could not
find it negligent."
In Burghardt v. Detroit United R.R., (1919), 206 Mich.
545, 173 N.W. 360, 5 A.L.R. 1333, at 1335 the Court, in considering
the sufficiency of the defense of a system of inspection of
trolley moorings, against the plaintiff's action that the trolley
fell off the car and hit him, a pedestrian, which was held sufficient to raise a prima facie case of negligence, or an inference
of negligence, as the court's substitution for res ipsa loquitur,
said:
"But defendant insists that it has established
an inspection, and that, there being direct proof
on the subject, the prima facie case, if one was
made by the plaintiff, must fail. This was the
view entertained by the learned trial judge. Our
difficulty in agreeing with this conclusion lies
in the fact that there is no competent evidence
of an actual inspection of the car in question.
The most that can be said of defendant's proof is
that it established a system of inspection
inferentially in consonance with good railroading.
But the proof does not establish that an inspection
was in fact made. Where the duty to inspect exists,
it is not discharged alone by the adoption of a
system of inspection, or the promulgation of a
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-20set of rules. The system must be used; the rules
must be enforced; the inspection must be made.
It was competent for the defendant to show that
it had adopted a system of inspection, what that
system was, that it comported with the requirements
of good railroading; and plaintiff's objections
to the introduction of such proof were properly
overruled; but to overcome plaintiff's prima
facie case it was necessary that defendant prove
an inspection in fact. This it failed to do.
The court, therefore, was in error in directing
a verdict."
In Bergen v. Tulare County Power Co., (1916), 173 Cal.
709, 161 P. 269, the Court observed that California recognized a
rule that where electricity is furnished to a system installed
and operated exclusively by the owner of the premises, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur will not apply.

It nevertheless held that

instructions to a jury involving a death that if the decedent
was exercising ordinary care and was killed by an excessive and
dangerous current furnished by the defendant through an electric
light wire, it was the burden of the defendant to show that the
excessive voltage was not due to its negligence and that this
was not an improper extension of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
since the control of the deceased over his pumping plant could
not have resulted in an increase of the voltage.
And so it is in this case. The fact that the transmission
line beyond the meter was owned by plaintiffs did not prevent
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, because the
evidence plainly showed that the phase reversal occurred upstream
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-21from the meters and, therefore, on the line of the defendant, it
being impossible that the outage and reversal on the Hatch ranch
could have been caused by Deseret or that the outage and reversal
on Deseret could have been caused from the Hatch ranch.
Defendant's showing here also was very similar to the
showing in Burghardt, supra, there being a

system of asking

for reports of trouble and of repairsf but with a complete absence
of the very necessary report causing the reversal in the first
place, and of absolute necessity of correcting the reversal in
the second place.
It is conceivable (although barely so) that had the trial
judge correctly applied the rules of res ipsa loquitur, he might
have found a sufficient defense from the evidence offered by the
defendant.

But the evidence that there were no reports and that

the line was well-constructed were only negative proof and did
not avoid the inference that since plaintiffs did not cause any
phase reversal, and certainly did not correct any phase reversal,
the events occurred somewhere on the Power Company's line. And
the absence of reports is a sort of tacit confession that there
was a negligent employee, who was either embarrassed or afraid
to report what had happened, and to report that he had corrected
a phase reversal would only have given rise to an inquiry of
whether he had also caused the reversal.
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-22POINT V
THERE WAS A BREACH OF THE ELECTRICAL SERVICE AGREEMENTS.
The Power Company entered into written contracts in the
form of electric service agreements with both Deseret and Hatch.
Pursuant to the terms of these contracts, the Power Company
agreed to supply both Deseret and Hatch electric service in the
amount of 150 kilowatts in the form of three-phase alternating
current at approximately 60 cycles per second and 480 volts for
Deseret's and Hatch's irrigation pumping operation.

(Exhibit

2-P, R. 5, 26, 50, 71)
The evidence as heretofore discussed leads inescapably
to the conclusion that the electrical power delivered to both
Deseret and Hatch was defective. Neither Deseret nor Hatch
contracted with the Power Company to receive electrical power
which was subject to reversing phases.

By delivering defective,

harmful power, the Power Company breached its contractual
agreement and is thereby liable to plaintiffs for any damage
they sustained.
While plaintiffs have not been able to find any cases
where this Court has considered a similar situation, courts
in other jurisdictions have frequently dealt with similar
problems.

Two older cases demonstrate that basic principles

of contract law have always been applied to cases involving
breach of contract by power companies.

In Kimball Brothers Co.

v. Citizens1 Gas & Electric Co., 141 Iowa 632, 118 N.W. 891
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-23(1908), the plaintiff claimed that the defendant power company
had breached the terms of a contract which required it to furnish
electrical power for an elevator system.

The elevator system

required 240 volts of current in order to operate its three-phase
monocylic system.

While the court reversed on other grounds, it

did hold that it was a question for the jury to determine whether
the defendant power company was liable in damages for breach of
contract.

The Court noted that there was sufficient evidence

to support a finding that defendant power company expressly agreed
to furnish the amount of voltage in question.
In Roben v. Ryegate Light & Power Co., 91 Vt. 402, 100 A.
768 (1917), the Court recognized that a power company would be
liable in damages for breach of contract in failing to provide
sufficient current to operate a business concern, as it had
contracted to do.
It might be argued that the electrical service agreements
in the present case do not expressly require the power company
to deliver electrical current free from phase reversal. However,
courts in other jurisdictions have expanded the notion of contract
liability in public utlility cases to include situations involving
implied contracts.

In these other jurisdictions, courts have

concluded that an agreement to supply adequate power or some
other similar agreement will give rise to an implied agreement
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-24to deliver power which is free from defects.
In Curry v. Norwood Electric Light & Power Co., 125 Misc.
279, 211 N.Y.S. 441 (1925), two movie theaters were allowed to
recover when the power company's failure to provide sufficient
power made it necessary for the plaintiff to refund the purchase
price of admission tickets sold.

The Court expressed the opinion

that the measure of liability should be that of a common carrier
and that any excuse for non-performance could rest only upon a
showing that an "act of God" or an "inevitable accident" had
caused the injury.

The Court ruled that the defendant power

company could have anticipated the situation which gave rise to
the damages and further concluded that the occurrence was one
which could reasonably have been anticipated and allowed a
recovery on a breach of implied warranty theory.
In Lund v. Princeton, 250 Minn. 472, 85 N.W.2d 1907
(1957), the defendant power company was held liable for damages
based on the reduced egg production in the plaintiff's hatchery.
The power company failed to provide the plaintiff with reasonably
adequate and continuous electrical power under an implied contract
to do so.
In the Lund case, the village that supplied its residents
with electrical power determined that it would be appropriate to
change from a Delta to a Wye transformer system and the change
resulted in a loss of power.

The village raised the defense that
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-25its action was not negligence and argued to the Court that negligence
is an element of all breach-of-contract actions. The Court pointed
out, however, that although some breach-of-contract actions are
necessarily based on negligence, it did not follow that all actions
based on implied contract between a supplier and a consumer are
dependent upon a showing of negligence.
Defendant offered in evidence Electric Service Regulations
approved by the Public Service Commission (R. 72). There is, of
course, no evidence that plaintiffs were aware of those regulations.
Regulation 18 purports to waive "irregularities and interruptions"
to service, and liability to customers for "damages occasioned
by irregularities or interruptions" if the Company has "used
reasonable diligence" (R. 72).
Sending power over a line and to a customer in reversed
phase without notice was held actionable negligence in Sugar
Brothers Company v. City of Monroe, 173 La. 760, 138 So. 658.
The reversal caused the elevator controls to work backwards,
causing the elevator to crash, resulting in repairs to the
elevator and building and loss of profits.
Furthermore, power in reverse appears to be more than
an irregularity, but a dangerous condition requiring notice as
in Sugar Brothers Company.

Defendant will say it could not give

notice if it did not know of the reversal.

But it has contracted

to deliver electricity for running electric motors attached to
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-26pumps.

It is charged with knowing its product to fulfill its

contract.
POINT VI
THERE WAS A BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS.
The Complaint was filed March 15, 1971 (R. 116). The
Order granting leave to file the Amended Complaint was dated
June 4, 1974 (R. 147). Causes of Action Third and Sixth plead
breach of implied warranty of electrical energy of merchantable
quality and fit for power to run electric motors and pumps.
Written notice of this claim was given in February 1971 (Exhibit
5-P) and on April 26, 1974 (Exhibit 9-P), receipt of which was
admitted by the Answer to Amended Complaint (R. 148).
The Memorandum Decision does not mention these Causes
of Action (R. 156). Appellants objected to the failure to
cover them in the Findings of Fact (R. 170), although Conclusion
of Law No. 3 (R. 166) holds that no specific or implied warranties
were made.
Electricity is a commodity.

Helvey v. Wabash County

REMC (Ind. Court of Appeals 1972) 278 N.E.2d 608. The company
delivered excessive voltage, causing damage to machines and
giving rise to a cause of action under the Uniform Commercial
Code and controlled by the statute of limitations of the U.C.C.
The sections cited were 1-202 (2) (c), 2-105(1) (2) and 2-725(2),
which in Utah are:

70A-1-102(2)(c), 70A-2-105(1)(2), 70A-2-725(2).

That is why plaintiffs gave the notice required by Section
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-2770A-2-607O)(a) before filing the Amended Complaint Exhibit 9-P).
Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, (1964) 413 Pa. 415f
197 A.2d 612, holds, on the other hand, that the sale of
electricity is a service but subject nevertheless to implied
warranties of fitness and merchantability, and directing a
verdict for the defendant was error.
Appellants submit that defendant makes implied warranties
of fitness and merchantability whether electricity be a commodity,
or the supplying of it a service.
POINT VII
PLAINTIFFS' DAMAGES EXCEEDED THE COST OF REPAIRS OF
PUMPS.
The trial court gratuitously commented on the matter
of damages:
"The Court is further of the opinion that if
damages were awarded the only actual damages
would have been the amount spent by the plaintiffs
in the repair of their respective motors. As to
loss of crop and forage there is abolutely no
showing that they suffered any loss therefrom."
(R. 157)
Without the pumps the land went dry and hay didn't grow
and the crops were lost. Also, because of no water there was no
forage.
Deseret failed to get the customary 1,000 tons of hay
and six weeks' pasturage for 1,000 head of cattle (R. 9, 10).
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-28Daniel Freed testified to the value of the lost hay and forage
(R. 21-22).

Hatch lost 90 days of feed for 300 head of cattle

or 900 Animal Unit Months worth $4.50 per unit (R. 29). Deseret
used up its carry-over hay on this and other ranches (R. 24).
Hatch lost forage for 300 head and just didn't have cattle on
the ranch that year (R. 32).

This loss of hay and forage was

proximately caused by the phase reversal and its loss was
compensable.
In Community Public Service Co. v. Gray (Tex. Civ. App.
1937), 107 S.W.2d 495, Gray sued for damage to his machine and for
loss of profits while the machine was down resulting from reversal
of current by the power company's employee.

Both types of damage

were allowed.
And in Kohler v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 192 Kan. 226,
387 P.2d 149, damage from food spoilage was allowed when the
power company improperly cut off the power.
Recovery for inability to raise crops on proof that
other crops in the vicinity were raised and were not planted with
the defective onion seed was allowed in Malone v. Hastings,
(Cir. Ct. N.Y.), 193 F. 1, 6.

See also, Putnam v. Lower, (CCA-1956),

236 F.2d 561, 571-572.
And here the only crop failures were on the portions
of land irrigated ordinarily by the damaged pumps (R. 9-10,
20-21, 29, 38).
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-29CONCLUSION
The Court erred in granting the motion to dismiss. All
the required elements were present for application of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur with its consequent inference of negligence
of the defendant.

Since the phase reversal occurred while no

one was near the motors on the plaintiffs1 transmission lines,
it is inescapable that the reversal occurred on the defendant's
line and damaged pumps on both ranches. This transmission of
current in reverse phase also constituted a breach of the Power
Company's contracts with the plaintiffs and breached the Power
Company's warranty of fitness and merchantability of the electric
current.
The judgment of dismissal should be reversed and the case
remanded for trial under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and
for determination of damages. Or, alternatively, judgment should
be entered for the plaintiffs under the theory of breach of
contract or breach of warranty of the electricity with remand
for determination of damages.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID A. ROBINSON
531 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RICHARD L. BIRD, JR.
200 Law Building
333 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellants
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The foregoing brief was served on the Defendant-Respondent
this 7th day of May, 1975, by mailing copies to its attorney,
Robert Gordon, at 1407 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah
84104.
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